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"Is the extended mind hypothesis nonsensical?"

ABSTRACT

The extended mind hypothesis (EM) claims that some of our mental states/processes extend outside our heads and into objects in our environment, such as notebooks and iPhones. The existing debate concerning EM has focused on questions of justification concerning EM: whether we should believe that EM is true or false based on current evidence. This paper takes a step back and focuses on a prior question: what does it even mean to say that mental states/processes "extend" into physical objects? Some theorists doubt that a good answer can be provided, and have concluded that EM is not a genuine statement of fact. In this paper, I look at 4 proposals for cashing out EM. I argue only one proposal---based on the realisation relation---has a chance of success. However, even the realisation proposal has significant, and unanticipated, revisionary consequences for EM.