The Institute of Philosophy RCH HAS cordially invites you to its upcoming talk

Frank Furedi
Fear of Judgement and the downsizing of Tolerance in Western public life

Outwardly the liberal ideal of tolerance remains one of the sacred values of Western society. However in practice tolerance has been redefined to  mean acceptance and non-judgementalism. Yet for liberal thinkers from Bayle and Locke onwards tolerance demanded an act of judgment. And as Hannah Arendt argued, judgment is an essential component of public life. Without judgment, tolerance becomes emptied of meaning. This talk explains why, in western public life, tolerance has been re-defined as a second order value that is trumped by the sacralisation of non-judgementalism.

Venue: 4 Tóth Kálmán st., Budapest, 1097; 7th floor, "Trapéz" room
Date: 23 Jaunuary 2018, 16.00

The Lendület Morals and Science Research Group, RCH HAS and the Institute Vienna Circle cordially invites you to the conference on

The Socio-Ethical Dimension of Knowledge: The Mission of Logical Empiricism
Date: 12-13 December 2017
Venue: 4 Tóth Kálmán st., 1014 Budapest (7th floor, "Trapese" room)

For the program see poster.

Organizers: Ádám Tamás Tuboly (Institute of Philsophy, RCH HAS) & Christian Damböck (Institute Vienna Circle)

Contact: tubolyadamtamas[at]

The Institute of Philosophy RCH HAS cordially invites you to its upcoming talk:

Justin Sytsma (Victoria University of Wellington):
Are religious philosophers less analytic?

Date: 5 December 2017, 16:00
Venue: 4. Tóth Kálmán st., Budapest, 1097; 7th floor


Some researchers in philosophy of religion have charged that the sub-discipline exhibits a number of features of poor health, prominently including that “partisanship is so entrenched that most philosophers of religion, instead of being alarmed by it, just take it for granted” (Draper and Nichols, 2013, 421). And researchers in experimental philosophy of religion have presented empirical work that supports this contention, arguing that it shows that confirmation bias plays a notable role in the acceptance of natural theological arguments among philosophers (De Cruz, 2014; Tobia, 2015; De Cruz and De Smedt, 2016).

But while these studies indicate that there is a correlation between religious belief and judgments about natural theological arguments, they do not establish that causation runs from belief to judgment as has been claimed. In this paper I offer an alternative explanation, suggesting that thinking style is a plausible common cause. I note that previous research has shown a significant negative correlation between analytic thinking style and both religious belief and religious engagement in the general population (Shenhav, Rand, and Greene, 2012; Gervaise and Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013; Jack et al., 2016).

Further, other research has shown a significant positive correlation between analytic thinking style and training in philosophy that is independent of overall level of education (Livengood et al., 2010).

Pulling these threads together, I hypothesize that there is an especially strong correlation between thinking style and religiosity among philosophers. This hypothesis is tested by looking at a sample of 524 people with an advanced degree in philosophy. The results support the hypothesis, showing a medium-large negative correlation between analytic thinking style and religious engagement that is roughly twice as strong as has been reported for the general population (r=-0.39 among men, r=-0.34 among women). And the correlation is even stronger if we restrict to Christian theists and non-theists (r=-0.61 among men, r=-0.62 among women).

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